The weeks ahead are sure to be busy as the offseason begins and we learn who is staying and who is going in Toronto.
We’ve heard from Craig Berube and the players following the Game 7 letdown, and President Brendan Shanahan has reportedly been granted permission to speak to the Islanders, as the offseason chatter is already well underway.
Before we look too far ahead, though, it’s important to take a step back and properly assess the Leafs‘ second-round series and overall playoff performance, so we don’t risk gleaning the wrong takeaways from what transpired.
At the highest level, the scores alone tell the tale of how this Leafs vs. Panthers series unfolded:
- G1 – 5-4 W
- G2 – 4-3 W
- G3 – 5-4 L
- G4 – 2-0 L
- G5 – 6-1 L
- G6 – 2-0 W
- G7 – 6-1 L
Early on in the series, the Leafs killed Florida in transition and found the back of the net with regularity, with some help from Sergei Bobrovsky at points. They were dangerous off the rush and backed off an aggressive Florida defense in the neutral zone after burning them so often.
In those first two games specifically, the Leafs scored three goals off 2v1s, a breakaway, and a 4v3 odd-man rush. As the series went on and Florida managed their gaps better with the help of improved back pressure from their forwards, the ice tightened up, and the Leafs‘ goal scoring sort of speaks for itself: a shutout, one goal in the final minute of a game, and four goals in four games overall.
Three of those goals, by the way, came off the rush. Ultimately, the Leafs couldn’t sustain any sort of offensive-zone pressure in order to generate offense in any other manner. Florida carried over 60 percent of the shot attempts in the series.
The Leafs ended the playoffs with the worst shot attempt share at five-on-five of all 16 teams. That’s not a surprising development, considering they entered the postseason as the worst five-on-five shot attempt team of all 16 playoff clubs. In fact, only Anaheim, San Jose, and Chicago were worse across the entire league. That’s not the company that a team with this many quality players should be keeping, and it is a genuine indictment of the coaching staff. The Leafs will need to sort through this in the summer.
We are told that the Leafs want to play big, heavy hockey, but when the chips were down as the series progressed, their forecheck couldn’t create any turnovers, and they essentially never cycled the Panthers in their own end. It was off the rush or bust.
Over the series, the Leafs gave up 3.71 goals per game, which was the most any team allowed in the second round, including a second-round high 20 five-on-five goals against. For context, only San Jose posted a worse goals against per game this regular season (3.78). In the regular season, the Leafs basically gave up a goal fewer per game (2.79), and they also conceded the third-fewest five-on-five goals against. Through and through, the Leafs were gashed by the Panthers.
It’s fair to note that part of this is due to Anthony Stolarz’s injury. Joseph Woll manufactured some good moments, but ultimately, he recorded an .886 save percentage in the second round. In his one shutout, the Leafs gave up the fewest high-danger attempts of any team in the playoffs so far. It wasn’t just a goaltending issue by any means, but Woll ultimately wasn’t good in the series.
It’s also important to note the gap in the goaltenders’ ability to play the puck; Stolarz is genuinely good at it, and Woll is decidedly poor at it. The Panthers’ forecheck took full advantage of Woll’s inability to play the puck with hard rims, and it did impact the series not only in terms of goals but also in controlling play.
Sergei Bobrovsky only recorded a .902 save percentage in the series, but after the first two games, he was a .935 the rest of the way.
Five-on-Five Matchups and Offense
Let’s dig a little deeper into the series splits.
The Leafs averaged 2.43 goals per game in the series, a steep drop from the 3.26 goals per game they scored in the regular season. Their 2.43 output would have been the lowest of any team in the league this season; considerably lower than the 2.54 goals per game the lowest scoring team in the regular season produced.
In fairness to the Leafs, they were the fourth-highest scoring team in the second round, so this is partly what happens in the playoffs in general: the scoring dries up. It is hard to score in the postseason.
The Leafs’ series average wasn’t completely out of place with general playoff offense over the seven games. The problem is that in the final four games of the series, the Leafs scored a grand total of four goals, one of which came in the final minute of a 6-0 game.
William Nylander and Max Pacioretty led the Leafs with six points each in the series. Nylander led them with three goals total, while all of Pacioretty, Morgan Rielly, Matthew Knies, Max Domi, and John Tavares chipped in two apiece. Mitch Marner tallied five points, while Auston Matthews finished with four. It is a reasonable collection of players producing, but there was no impressive high-water mark at the top of the pack.
Brad Marchand led all players in the series in scoring with eight points, while his linemate Eetu Loustarainen notched seven. This line rolling for Florida gave the Leafs serious matchup fits. In large part, this series felt like it was a three-line team pitted against a two-line team.
Half of the Leafs’ regular forwards did not score a goal in the series: Scott Laughton, Bobby McMann, Calle Jarnkrok, Pontus Holmberg, and Steven Lorentz. That wasn’t entirely off from the Panthers, who had three regular forwards go without a goal, including Matthew Tkachuk. Tkachuk, by the way, has never scored a playoff goal against the Leafs (good thing he plays in a place where there is no pressure!).
Only two lines were a constant for the Leafs: the Matthews line and the Lorentz-Laughton-Jarnkrok line. The Pacioretty-Tavares-Nylander trio did play 42 minutes together at five-on-five, but Tavares and Nylander also played multiple games with Pontus Holmberg on the left wing for a total of 25:57 of the series.
The Matthews line won their minutes overall, 6-5. So did the Tavares line with Pacioretty at 5-2. When Holmberg was on the second line, they were outscored 3-0; at the end of the series, the second line came out even as a unit. The Laughton line was outscored 2-0, while the most common fourth line — McMann-Domi-Holmberg — was outscored 1-0.
Ultimately, those numbers outline the chasm within the team and the crux of the issue.
The Leafs’ most common bottom six consisted of Laughton, Lorentz, Jarnkrok, Domi, Holmberg, and McMann. They pay this entire group of players a grand total of $10.275 million, or less than any one individual in the “Core Four.”
The Panthers used their third line against the Matthews line for large portions of the series and shifted around their matchups several times. Anton Lundell makes nearly half of the Leafs’ entire bottom six at $5 million per season. Technically, Brad Marchand makes more at $6.125 million, but the Panthers acquired him with retention. Loustarainen would have been the second-highest-paid player in the Leafs’ bottom six, behind Domi.
The Panthers’ bottom six should be better because they pay them a lot more money. Florida’s third line, even with Marchand’s salary 50% retained, costs more than the entire Toronto bottom six.
The Leafs’ whole model is based on paying their top players massive dollars to dominate their matchups. This is really nothing new to anyone at this point; their eggs are in a top-heavy basket, and when the top six is up a grand total of one goal over seven games, the Leafs will lose the series.
The only alternative is to spread out the wealth. Regular readers of this space will know I wrote about this a million times after the trade deadline, and have done so for years. After the trade deadline, the Leafs tried spreading out their top three players across three lines for all of one game — against Ottawa, a game I attended. Their top players did not appear to buy into it at all, and we never saw it again.
William Nylander was the best player on the ice in the first two games of the series, and while the Panthers’ third line caused problems, so did the Panthers switching their matchups. Nylander’s most common opponent in the series was Gustav Forsling, with those head-to-head minutes coming largely after those first two games, and the goals were 1-1 in the matchup.
The Panthers put their best defenseman against Nylander, and Matthews-Marner drew even against what is ostensibly Florida’s second pairing, plus either the Barkov or Lundell line.
Together, Matthews and Marner were ultimately up 11-7 in five-on-five goals in the playoffs. It’s a one percentage point difference from what Connor McDavid and Leon Draisaitl have done together so far this spring. They were fine to good. The difference, beyond most of Matthews-Marner’s damage coming in the first round, is that the Oilers split up their duo for long stretches, too. Draisaitl is currently carrying a line with Kasperi Kapanen and Vasily Podkolzin.
This is the reality of the salary math: The Leafs faced a team that pays their third line $11 million, and the Leafs were countering with a third line under $4.4 million (the Laughton line was generally deployed as their third line, minutes-wise).
The bottom line: If the Leafs’ top players dominated to a level commensurate with their salary (the highest-paid player in the league, and the highest combined salary of four teammates across the league), then a meager -3 goal differential from the bottom two lines over seven games would be a non-story. This isn’t to suggest the Leafs’ top players were outright bad in the series, but they weren’t elite. They didn’t find a way to mask over the team’s flaws the way other elite players do.
It wasn’t like Barkov dominated for Florida, either; he tallied five points in the series. But he makes $10 million, which is about in line with how the Leafs’ top players performed. If the Leafs’ stars were paid like the Panthers’ stars, the Leafs would have the cap flexibility to build out their depth properly.
It felt like Craig Berube found this out the hard way in this series: The Leafs’ stars don’t elevate and carry their team the way some of the other stars in their salary range do.
Round and round we go.
Trade Deadline
Speaking of salary, this is a good time to address the trade deadline acquisitions. Marchand led the series in scoring while Seth Jones was the best player on the ice in Game 7. It’s fair to suggest the Panthers’ deadline moves put them over the top.
Meanwhile, Scott Laughton went pointless in the series, as did Brandon Carlo.
The difference again is mainly felt in the cap dollars. Part of the reason the Leafs paid such big prices is that they paid up for multi-year retention. Between Laughton and Carlo, following retention, the team brought in just under $5 million in salary. They moved out just under $2.3 million to accommodate the additions by moving out Connor Dewar and Conor Timmins.
By comparison, Florida placed Tkachuk on LTIR and took full advantage. They added Seth Jones for $7 million, Marchand for just over $3 million, Nico Sturm for $2 million, and Vitek Vanecek for $3.4 million, while only moving out Spencer Knight’s $4.5 million. They added a healthy scratch and backup goalie for more cap dollars than the Leafs had to play with in total to add two regulars. The Panthers added two legitimate contributors on top of those depth pieces, both of whom selected Florida as their destination (Jones and Marchand).
Full marks to Florida for gaming the system — something the Leafs continue not to do, which is a story in and of itself — but the deck was stacked in their favour to make additions. Bill Zito took full advantage.
Conversely, I’m not entirely sure what the Leafs could have done differently at forward for $1.5 million, and they definitely needed another right-handed defenseman to go along with their Laughton addition.
I am not here to fully defend the Leafs’ deadline — I expressed concerns about Laughton a month before his acquisition — but much like the five-on-five matchups, they have to take a step back, assess how this plays out each and every season, and conclude that they are setting themselves up for failure. They are constantly building a third line out of bubble gum and popsicle sticks while their opposition commits real dollars to building out depth and can do it because of their salary configuration.
Three of four conference finalists have at least one $5 million player on their third line. The one that doesn’t is Carolina, who had to go through the mediocre Metro bracket, has Seth Jarvis playing nearly 55 minutes with their 3C (Jordan Staal) so far this playoffs, and has a $4.85 million 4C right now in Jesperi Kotkaniemi.
Special Teams
While the Leafs’ power play largely struggled, let’s start with the penalty kill, which was actually quite strong. The Leafs killed off 82.6 percent of their penalties in this series, the same percentage as the third-ranked Vancouver Canucks in the regular season. It was a near five percent improvement on the Leafs’ regular season PK, and it was a big reason they won Game 6 (the PK went 4-for-4).
The Leafs rode two defense pairings on the kill in the series. All of Jake McCabe, Chris Tanev, Simon Benoit, and Brandon Carlo played over two minutes per game shorthanded. Their length is disruptive, they clear the net-front well, and they were fearless getting into shooting lanes and blocking shots.
At forward, the Leafs were rolling six forwards, ranging from Marner at 2:02 per game to Lorentz at 1:23 per game. Jarnkrok, Knies, Laughton, and Matthews completed the grouping. They were legitimately good against a fully healthy Panthers power play that ranked 13th this season.
On the flip side, Toronto’s power play was a real problem. They clicked at just 10 percent after going 2-for-20 in the series, and one of those goals came from the second unit. So the top unit scored once in seven games across 20 power plays in total. There’s no one reason why a team loses a playoff series, but if someone were to tell us going into this series that the Leafs’ power play would click at 10 percent, every single fan and their mother would tell you that they are not beating the Florida Panthers.
The Leafs’ top unit, in particular, was regularly outworked by the Panthers’ penalty kill. They didn’t adjust to their pressure and move it faster, or work it well down low consistently, and they regularly lost battles on the walls, leading to clears.
It’s a slightly updated but broken record at this point: The Leafs have won two playoff series with this group, and in both those series, their power play was really effective. In essentially every other series the Leafs have lost, the man advantage has been poor, including this seven-game loss to Florida.
I also wanted to note the penalty disparity in the series. In the final four games, power plays were 15-8 for the Florida Panthers. I can’t be convinced that the Leafs deserved essentially double the penalties. Florida led the league in penalties taken this season but were suddenly extremely clean, while the Leafs — a mid-pack penalty team — were suddenly much more penalized? This same kind of scenario played out in 2023 against Florida, too.
When Evan Rodrigues was called for embellishment, every Paul Maurice press conference contained little quips about it for days afterward. In 2023, who can forget Maurice counting the penalties with his fingers to the refs? The Panthers constantly cry about it, but we see why. It works.
It’s commendable in some ways that Berube turns the other cheek, and under Brendan Shanahan, the Leafs as an organization have not tried to play these mind games. But the Panthers enjoyed a 4-2 power play advantage in Game 6 and the only power play in Game 7. One of those Leafs’ power plays across two games was cut short when suddenly, the official could identify a high stick properly. I’d wager that putting this on notice ahead of Game 7 would have ensured the team got at least one power play. Instead, clear infractions were ignored.
I genuinely believe the Leafs as an organization need to rethink their approach in this regard. I understand why they try not to get caught up in the officiating, but they just finished a series where their starting goalie was knocked out of the series with a concussion without repercussions, and the most penalized team in the league suddenly couldn’t take a penalty when the games mattered. They need to do their best to manage the officiating versus turning a blind eye to it every spring.
Final Thoughts
Heading into this series, the Leafs were the clear underdogs. This is a really good Florida Panthers team that, should they win the Cup again, is bordering on dynasty territory. They made quick work of Tampa Bay, and if G1 against Carolina was any indication, they should make quick work of the Hurricanes as well. The Leafs took them to seven, and they did it without the services of their starting goalie. If we reverse the scenario and the Leafs faced Vitek Vanecek in the series, I’m more than confident in suggesting they would’ve easily beaten them.
However, both Game 5 and Game 7 got away from the Leafs in drastic fashion. It happening once in a series is reasonably understandable; blowouts happen more often than people think. But twice — both at home — and in two games with such high-level significance is difficult to fathom.
Making this even more confounding is the play of the Leafs’ top players down the stretch. Nylander was good in Game 5 but no-showed in Game 6 and Game 7. Matthews and Marner were good in Game 6 but no-showed in the other two. Again, the Leafs don’t possess the depth to survive this. It’s not nearly good enough from their leaders.
While the Leafs did push Florida to the edge, it’s rather startling that when the Panthers most needed wins in the biggest games down the stretch of the series, they not only won but dominated. If we zoom out on the series, the Panthers were basically good in all seven games, even their losses, while the Leafs were generally good in four games (their 2-0 loss in Game 4 flattered them).
Fans are so past celebrating moral victories at this point that I’m not going to insult anyone’s intelligence by arguing the Leafs were that close. But it’s also silly to swing the complete other way and conclude a full teardown is in order here. They were full marks in some of these wins, and this is a Panthers team that will probably coast to the Cup Finals.
The Leafs need to make changes, but they can’t — and shouldn’t — throw the baby out with the bath water. This is a good hockey team with a lot of really good pieces in place, but they need to reflect on this series with two main takeaways: They need to control play better, and they need to build out (at least) three proper lines.
Those two goals go hand-in-hand. The Leafs have cap flexibility to play with and a lot of key pieces already in place. There are a bunch of paths to move forward and attempt to achieve these objectives, and as we start approaching the offseason game plans, those two goals will be my main areas of focus.
